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10-02-2019 CIRCUIT COURT **DANE COUNTY, WI** 1 STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT DAMESCOMMEN 2 LEONARD POZNER, 3 Plaintiff, 4 Case No. 18-CV-3122 VS. 5 JAMES FETZER, et al., 6 Defendants. 7 8 TRANSCRIPT OF FINAL PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 9 commencing on the 5th day of September, 2019, at approximately 10 1:30 p.m. before the 11 HONORABLE JUDGE FRANK D. REMINGTON 12 13 14 APPEARANCES: LEONARD POZNER appeared by Attorneys at Law, JACOB ZIMMERMAN and GENEVIEVE ZIMMERMAN, 15 Meshbesher & Spence, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and EMILY FEINSTEIN, Quarles & Brady, 16 Madison, Wisconsin 17 18 JAMES FETZER and MIKE PALACEK appeared by Attorney at Law, RICHARD BOLTON, Boardman & 19 Clark, Madison, Wisconsin 20 2.1 22 Reported by: Colleen C. Clark, RPR 23 Official Court Reporter, Branch 8 Dane County Circuit Court 24 215 S. Hamilton Street Room 4109 Madison, WI 53703-3290 25

1	(Proceeding began at 1:30 p.m.)
2	THE COURT: This is 18-CV-3122, <u>Leonard Pozner</u>
3	versus James Fetzer, et al.
4	May I have the appearances, please.
5	MS. FEINSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Emily
6	Feinstein from Quarles and Brady here on behalf of the
7	Plaintiff.
8	MR. ZIMMERMAN: Jake Zimmerman on behalf of the
9	Plaintiff.
10	MS. ZIMMERMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
11	Genevieve Zimmerman also with the Plaintiff.
12	THE COURT: Welcome.
13	MR. BOLTON: And Rich Bolton for the Defendants.
14	THE COURT: Welcome, Mr. Bolton. Good to have
15	you here.
16	MR. BOLTON: I thought you'd say that.
17	THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I always observe, I
18	think Mr. and Mrs. Zimmerman and Ms. Feinstein might also
19	know that there are a lot of things there's a lot of
20	problems you'll avoid when there's a lawyer on the other
21	side.
22	MR. BOLTON: I understand that.
23	THE COURT: Okay. We're here for the final
24	pre-trial conference. I've gone through what's been
25	filed. I intend to just run through the jury

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instructions, special verdict, the motions in limine, talk about the witnesses, order of witnesses, any other issue that you want to take up so we can hit the ground running right away the first day of trial.

Before I start with what things I want to accomplish, is there anything, Ms. Feinstein, that you want to take up first? Or Mr. Zimmerman?

MS. FEINSTEIN: Nothing that needs to be taken up first.

THE COURT: Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So since the summary judgment hearing, the parties were aware that I did get a letter from at least one individual. The truth be told, I actually don't currently remember even what it said. I don't know if, Mr. Bolton, you got that. I think it was, my recollection, didn't really like what I was doing. I have become aware of, because of the news worthiness, that there were some articles in the paper, some things posted, none of which have any bearing on the function that I serve and how I intend to handle this case.

However, the first issue I want to raise is the task of selecting the jury. And I just propose, and then I'll hear from you as to what your thoughts are, that we consider an anonymous jury. I've never had one. No

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recollection of one being in Dane County. But there -they do exist. And, I would be amenable to it if both
parties wanted it.

Before I ask you what you think, here's the way I thought. I'm not sure that it benefits or hurts disproportionally either of the parties. One could assume that a juror who then is anonymous might more likely render a verdict based on the facts and the law that I give rather than their own personal feelings about -- of retaliation.

I will tell you, I did have one defamation case as a judge, and when I went back after they found the defendant had defamed the plaintiff, one of the questions of the jurors was, well, I'm a little worried, is he going to -- the defendant -- come to my house? Obviously, those external thoughts of the personal interest of the jurors are not germane to the process.

So would an anonymous juror more likely give
the -- the defendants a fair and impartial day not knowing
that if they were to agree with the defendants, their
names and addresses wouldn't appear in the news? Would
they be more fair and partial to the plaintiff, fearing
that if they ruled for the plaintiff, their names and
addresses wouldn't appear in the public documents
ascertainable by groups that are interested in this issue

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from a -- the same vantage point as the defendants?

Just to keep you on your toes, I'll switch up,
rather than Plaintiff, Mr. Bolton, what do you think?

MR. BOLTON: I don't know that I have an opinion
on it right now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Zimmerman? Or Ms. -- I don't

THE COURT: Mr. Zimmerman? Or Ms. -- I don't want to ignore you. Who wants to do the talking today?

Ms. Feinstein, you are sort of in the lead chair there.

MS. FEINSTEIN: It does make me feel important, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There you go. I like that.

MS. FEINSTEIN: We don't have a problem with that, Your Honor. I think I know I personally have not, maybe luckily, gotten any letters like the Court got, but I would -- I am somewhat surprised I haven't. Hopefully they're all going to Mr. Zimmerman at this point. But, no, we don't have a problem with an anonymous jury.

THE COURT: I'm a little worried about the jury selection. I don't even know how many jurors to call. I did talk to the juror clerk about how many spares we have downstairs in the case that we have an usually high number of people who don't want to serve.

I will tell you all maybe what you've witnessed before, but from my vantage point, hearing it from me. I can see when a juror raises their hand and says something

like, I don't think I can be fair and impartial. Then I 1 have a colloquy about, well, you understand that you 2 3 haven't heard the evidence. Can't you sit there and hear the evidence and listen attentively and apply the law? 4 5 Sometimes they say, I think I can do that, and then I 6 don't strike for cause. If they are steadfast in saying, 7 Nope, I can't. I made up my mind. The guy's guilty. And then I let them go. I can see it, they -- the person on 8 9 their right looks over to the left, the person on their 10 left looks over to their right, and all the hands start 11 coming up and it's a -- it's a snowball. It will 12 snowball. I'm a little concerned that one way or the other, I mean, I'm not -- I'm not saying this benefits the 13 14 Plaintiff or the Defendants, but don't want to run out of jurors. If the jurors' names were not in the public 15 16 record, then that might allay some of the concerns about 17 the jurors' possibility about fearful of retribution by 18 any vantage point. 19 MR. BOLTON: So the proposal or the suggestion, 20 Your Honor, is how would it work then?

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THE COURT: Well it would work exactly like before. Molly has an example. Why don't we just hand them what the jury clerk just threw together. You'll get that sheet of paper that you always get except for the names and addresses won't be in the columns. We'll just

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refer to them as juror number --1 2 THE CLERK: Pool number. 3 THE COURT: By their pool number. And then the little carbon copies, we'll do the same thing. We'll just 4 -- we will just obliterate or we'll create a facsimile 5 6 that does not have -- does not have the last name. Now 7 maybe we can keep the first name or we just would instruct -- these are filled out on the day of jury --8 9 we'd instruct them to leave the last name and the spouse's 10 last names blank. Otherwise, you would have all the 11 information, just not their names and not their addresses. 12 MR. BOLTON: So that's the only -- that would be 13 the only change in terms of the process that we'd follow 14 then? THE COURT: I believe so. 15 16 MR. BOLTON: Yeah. I -- I don't have any 17 objection to that, Your Honor. 18 MS. FEINSTEIN: And then, Your Honor, would we, 19 essentially, before we file the special verdict form or 20 post it on, you know, that that would be the foreman's or 2.1 foreperson's name would be redacted? 22 THE COURT: No, just put the number down. 23 MS. FEINSTEIN: Just put the number down. THE COURT: The court record would have -- we'd 24 25 have the court record under seal would have the names with

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the pool numbers.

All right. Let's do this. Sensing that all the parties -- both parties -- all parties are in agreement, we'll go ahead that way. If for some reason, Mr. Bolton, in talking to your client, because I understand they're not here, or, Ms. Feinstein, talking to your client, there is a change, then we can easily -- very easily switch back. But we'll proceed then with an anonymous jury. If you do want to change your mind on that then I'd like you to let me know one week before the jury trial.

All right. Let's take up the -- the details with regard to getting the jury trial in the time. We have it on for one week. Plaintiff is obviously going to open, having the burden of proof.

Ms. Feinstein, how many witnesses do you have? MS. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor, can I -- sorry, go back to the picking of the -- the issues about picking the jury?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. FEINSTEIN: With respect to your concern about kind of jurors looking to their right and left and seeing how other people answer questions and having some concerns about jurors expressing their concerns about being unbiassed, do we think it might help if we did voir dire individually? It would be less efficient, I

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understand, but, meaning, individual pool members would be voir dired alone.

THE COURT: You know, I don't think so. Dane

County's always had sort of a nonindividual voir dire that

I know of. It's very efficient. My sister and

brother-in-law practice law in Minneapolis. They don't -
and jury selection takes like weeks. I can't -
Mr. Zimmerman, your home jurisdiction, I can't imagine.

Generally speaking, you know, in Dane County, I don't know

that I've ever heard of even a homicide trial that takes

more than a day to pick the jury. There's just no such

thing as a multiday jury pick.

Going back to it, all we've decided here today is just simply not have the names and addresses of the jurors in the public record. I mean, I don't know -- we're going to proceed that way. I mean, again, I'm not sure what the names mean anyway. I do ask the question, are you familiar with the lawyers or the parties, and so if there's that familiarity that otherwise the name would have been recognized. I doubt that applies to Mr. Pozner, not really being from Dane County. I don't know with your client, I mean, he's a recent transplant to Dane County. Mike Palecek isn't from Dane County --

MR. BOLTON: Right.

THE COURT: -- so the chances they would have a

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personal relationship. It's possible the lawyers might know someone.

I don't -- I'm not saying that you should change your voir dire in any respect because of that. You can ask -- I'm not limiting the questions either of the parties ask.

There were a couple -- you reminded me. you, Ms. Feinstein. Would the parties like me to ask the jurors any specific questions other than the standard, Do you live in Dane County? Have you been convicted of a felony? This trial lasted a week, do you know of any reason why you can't serve? There have been cases -- I've had a couple of cases in which the lawyers wanted me to ask a certain set of questions. Ms. Feinstein?

MS. FEINSTEIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What do you think, Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: As I sit here, I -- I have not -- I don't have a list of specific questions.

THE COURT: Because, you know, in federal court, the tradition is the judge does ask a lot of questions, many of which are proposed by the lawyers. Some may feel that it becomes then less confrontational for the juror to have that maybe perhaps delicate inquiry coming from the Court rather than from the parties.

MR. BOLTON: Well, Your Honor -- I'm sorry.

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1 that process that they use in the federal court, I don't 2 have any problem with that. Now, typically, they will ask 3 the lawyers to submit some questions to the Court in advance then and then the Court will make some decisions 4 on what questions from the -- from those --5 6 THE COURT: Right. 7 MR. BOLTON: -- offered by the attorneys, and that might be advantageous as well. I can tell you that, 8 you know, I'm not going to be inundating the Court with 10 seven pages of questions, but -- but if the Court wants to

THE COURT: No, I don't want -- I don't want to do that. I just simply wanted to raise the possibility that either side might want the Court to ask some questions. I'll tell you what, as we proceed, I won't, but if you want me to, no later than a week before the trial, respond and say, On further reflection, I would request that the Court ask the following questions. And then we can take up whether there's objections to them first thing Monday morning on the day of the trial.

basically conduct the voir dire with some input from the

lawyers, I don't have any problem with that.

The e-mails that have been coming into the Court have been saved. I did share with you the letter that I have. I haven't -- I'm aware that e-mails have come in.

That's about all I can think of on the jury selection.

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I have not relied on the e-mails. They play no part in it. You're welcome to get copies of them if you'd like.

Ms. Feinstein?

MS. FEINSTEIN: We don't need to see them, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: When you say e-mails, from -- from just --

THE COURT: Well, some e-mails come in from -one of the deputy clerks is -- apparently, has the misfortune on being on a group distribution list. I did save them because I had thought early on about the issue of an anonymous jury that I -- were there -- where there wasn't an agreement, I believed I would need to make a factual record that this case was different than other cases because of the public's interest and the kind of -the kind of nature of the interest that this case has generated. And that if these communications -- these e-mails or these postings or the like, I felt that at the time would be perhaps relevant to a factual basis for creating -- for having an anonymous jury. My name is right down here in black and white, I mean, so it's not for me, but -- but like I say, I just had saved them for that purpose, but since there's a stipulation on the anonymous jury then I don't think that they need to be

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necessarily made a record in this case.

MR. BOLTON: I'm -- I'm in agreement with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else on the jury selection?

And then hearing that --

MR. BOLTON: What -- I guess I'd ask one question. Obviously, there are two defendants. Are -- in terms of strikes then, each defendant gets strikes then or?

THE COURT: No. I think -- I'm -- I'm mostly familiar with the law, not prepared for the -- having prepared. I think the law is, Mr. Bolton, is it depends on the -- sort of the infinity or the relationship of the co-defendants. Now, for example, if the co-defendants each had their own individual lawyer and their interests were not necessarily aligned, then that -- that might generate.

I'll give you an example. When, many years ago, I tried the pharmaceutical case, the question was what came up in the litigation -- multistate litigation is if you had a case against multiple defendants, do they get one set or are they sharing the line. So there is case law on it.

My impression having dealing with your clients,

Mr. Fetzer and Mr. Palecek, is they're pretty much aligned completely in their interests and their positions, their perspective, their involvement, and their representation.

Are you asking for me --

MR. BOLTON: Well, I'm not sure -- I'm not sure I necessarily -- for instance, on potential punitive damages whether or not, you know, their positions would necessarily be identical.

THE COURT: Let's do this.

MR. BOLTON: Pardon?

THE COURT: Let's do this, Mr. Bolton. You -you do -- tentatively, you don't -- you'll get sort of one
set of strikes on each side. I can tell you, I think
it's -- it's a jury of 12, we'll pull two alternates, 14,
and each of you will get four strikes, so I'll seat 22.

If you think then you get another set of strikes, file a
brief in support of that request. And, like I said, the
case law is out there. I think --

MR. BOLTON: The proposal though or what Your Honor is saying is that right now as it stands is that each -- each table would have four?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. BOLTON: Okay.

THE COURT: Is that acceptable to you as you sit

here today?

MR. BOLTON: It is, but I -- I would at least 1 reserve the right to look at it and if I -- if I -- if 2 3 I -- if I come to a different conclusion, advise the Court. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Just bear in mind if we start 5 6 stacking up lots of stuff for Monday morning, I'd like to 7 get the jury up quickly and get this in. So have -barring hearing from you to the -- to the contrary, we'll 8 9 just each -- each side will get the four strikes. 10 Anything else on the jury selection or the 11 process? 12 MS. FEINSTEIN: No, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Now, how many -- the 14 Plaintiff, how many witnesses? MS. FEINSTEIN: Three, Your Honor. 15 16 THE COURT: And who are your witnesses? 17 MS. FEINSTEIN: Our client, Mr. Pozner, 18 Mr. Lubit -- excuse me, Dr. Lubit, and Mr. --19 THE COURT: How do you spell Lubit? 20 MS. FEINSTEIN: L-U-B-I-T. 2.1 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MS. FEINSTEIN: And then Defendant Fetzer. THE COURT: Okay. Who's your first witness and 23 24 how long do you suppose the first witness will take on 25 direct?

1	MS. FEINSTEIN: Mr. Pozner, and we believe
2	probably about an hour.
3	THE COURT: Okay. And next, number 2 is?
4	MS. FEINSTEIN: Lubit, Dr. Lubit.
5	THE COURT: And how long?
6	MS. FEINSTEIN: Probably as well, about an hour.
7	THE COURT: All right. And then Fetzer, cross,
8	adverse?
9	MS. FEINSTEIN: Probably about an hour, but he
10	can go on sometimes, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: All right. So my experience is when
12	you say an hour direct, that's about two hours on the
13	stand, give or take a little for cross. Fetzer might be a
14	little different because he may be recalled. I don't know
15	if you'll do your your whole direct or you'll wait.
16	My guess is then, Mr. Bolton, you ought to be
17	prepared to put your first witness on either first thing
18	or second thing Tuesday morning. Who how many
19	witnesses do you have?
20	MR. BOLTON: You know, Your Honor, I apologize.
21	I'm not absolutely certain. But I think it's going to
22	probably including the defendants, themselves, probably a
23	total of about six.
24	THE COURT: Who's your first witness?
25	MR. BOLTON: I think the first witness would be

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THE COURT: Okay. So you're not calling Scott Bennett?

MR. BOLTON: Um, again, I -- no, I don't -- I did not list him, and I -- that would be my position right now. And, again, I guess what I would ask is if I -- if I go over these and make a -- another decision, that I would advise the Court by Monday of this next week if there's any -- any changes to --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOLTON: -- my proposed witness list.

THE COURT: All right. I don't -- when I -- by asking that question, I don't intend to so much absolutely lock you in, but if -- if the parties had listed dozens and dozens of witnesses that clearly could not be heard from in the span of the trial, then obviously, we have a problem. I mean, given the Plaintiff, essentially, closing their case sometime on Tuesday-ish, it looks like you have at most about two days of trial.

MR. BOLTON: I think that's about right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so that -- I always say I like to get it to the jury no later than lunch time on Friday.

Okay. Anything further on the witnesses? Ms. Feinstein?

MR. BOLTON: Your Honor --

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MS. FEINSTEIN: No, Your Honor.

MR. BOLTON: -- what -- what I might propose with opposing counsel is -- and I think we've talked about this a little bit as well -- that -- and I -- I don't have a particular date in mind, I will share with him a witness list and tell him specifically if, you know, if somebody is a certainty or I'm uncertain.

THE COURT: I don't think you have to do anything more than what you've done. I've looked at what -- the names you've given me.

MR. BOLTON: Okav.

THE COURT: Are -- are included on the defendants' -- your clients' witness lists. So those names should not be a surprise to the Plaintiff.

And, quite honestly, you named off every one of them except for Bennett, and I don't even know what Bennett would say and how long it would be, but because I think your case is -- you said I needed two days, that's not unreasonable for a defendant -- two defendants in a one-week trial. But if you want to have mutual agreements to make your jobs better, I don't discourage that and certainly, I encourage it.

MR. BOLTON: Okay, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's turn to the special verdict. Ms. Feinstein, I would say your special

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verdict could be characterized, it seems to me, is that you've taken, essentially, every statement and turned them into a separate cause of action.

MS. FEINSTEIN: I -- I think that -- I think the difference between the special -- there are a couple differences between our special verdict, but that's one major difference is they basically say statements for each defendant, whereas we go through the various statements. Your Honor, we have discussed theirs versus ours on whether it's necessary to go through the specific statements, and we're fine with respect to the statements, to adopt the version that they've proposed.

THE COURT: I like that. You read my mind. Ι thought it was cleaner, it's simpler. It reduces the possibility of confusion for the jury. The problem also for yours, slightly, respectfully, was it didn't have the instructions, and usually, if jurors can get confused, they'll get confused on, well, they didn't answer yes, do they go onto the next. I think also the single question is consistent with the case -- the way the case has been pled and prosecuted. All right.

So then turning to Defendants' Proposed Special Verdict. Mr. Bolton, you note that Jury Instruction 2520 does have a choice between the terms actual malice and express malice. The Plaintiff in their proposed jury

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instructions and special verdict used actual. Does it make a difference to you?

MR. BOLTON: Your Honor, I -- in this particular case, I'm not sure that I have a preference one way or the other. What I would say is this. I think -- I think the actual, the -- I think the correct law on this is that where you do not have a public interest defendant, I think that it is actually -- the correct standard is expressed rather than actual.

THE COURT: Let's see what 2520 says. You had 2513. 2513 is expressed malice. That jury instruction says:

Express malice exists when a defamatory statement is made or published concerning a person for motives of ill will, bad intent, envy, spite, hatred, revenge, or other bad motives against the person defamed.

Express malice cannot be inferred solely from the fact that a statement was false and injurious to the plaintiff. In determining whether either defendant acted with express palace in making the statement about plaintiff, you will take into consideration the words used and all other facts and circumstances existing at the time the statement was made or published.

2520 is defamation for punitive damages. So they both have -- excuse me, 2511. So 2520 is the general

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that defines the punitive damages in a defamation case, and then it instructs us to say, Where you're proceeding under express malice, you give Jury Instruction 2513; if you're proceeding under actual malice, give Jury Instruction 2511.

## 25 -- I've read 2513. 2511:

Because of protections afforded a defendant such as Mr. Fetzer or Mr. Palecek under the First Amendment of the Constitution, Mr. Pozner must prove that any defamatory statements published by the defendants were made with actual malice before you award punitive damages.

Did you research this, Ms. Feinstein? I don't -- you -- you add --

MS. FEINSTEIN: If -- Your Honor, I believe part of the reason we picked 2511 is because Mr. Fetzer has said he's a journalist. It was a -- there was a motion at our last hearing that the Court didn't -- in the end didn't need to take up where he was arguing that he had a privilege as a journalist to not respond to certain discovery requests, and so I think we anticipated he would continue to take that position.

MR. BOLTON: And, I guess, I -- I'm uncertain in terms of what the Court's conclusion was then at the summary judgment --

THE COURT: Well --

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MR. BOLTON: -- hearing.

THE COURT: I'll fill you in.

MR. BOLTON: Yeah.

THE COURT: It wasn't so much --

MR. BOLTON: And I've read the transcript.

THE COURT: Okay. He made a concession -- a significant concession. He did not want to produce certain documents because he claimed he was a journalist and therefore, entitled to a privilege to withhold his source information.

The Plaintiffs, when asked, said that the information was relevant to the question of the element of -- that applies to the difference between a public person or a private individual. And then when your client then discerned the relevance of this proceeding under that theory, I asked, well, if you agree that Mr. Pozner is not a public person, then the Plaintiff said they'll withdraw the request and they don't need it and they don't need to prove it. And so in exchange for not having to produce what he didn't want to, what he may have very well been required to, he said he agreed that Mr. Pozner could be treated as a private individual.

MR. BOLTON: And -- and that's my understanding as well. But I guess what I'm -- I'm -- and maybe I'm not fully understanding counsel then. Is -- is the question

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then of -- of the journalist privilege still an open issue in the case then or is that?

THE COURT: It's not.

MR. BOLTON: Okav.

THE COURT: I don't believe so.

MR. BOLTON: Yeah. And -- and, Your Honor, that was how I read the transcript as well.

But the -- the instruction they're proposing then, in terms of the constitutional privilege, I think, is premised on -- on there still being the journalist privilege in the case. And that's why -- that's why -that's why my proposed instruction did not use the actual malice, because I thought -- I was construing the situation then as basically being a private person lawsuit for defamation against a private defendant, and in that situation, I think the -- I think the standard for malice is expressed malice in that situation.

THE COURT: Ms. Feinstein?

MS. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor, Mr. Fetzer -- I think the motion to compel and the journalistic privilege issue that came up at the last hearing ended up not being necessary based on the Court's determination on summary judgment, and the fact that Mr. Fetzer just really didn't pursue this idea that he thought our client was a public figure, but I don't think that he dropped the argument or

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his position that he's a journalist. I mean, he's published any number of books. He has a blog. He, I think, would say if he were here today that he believes that it is his duty as a journalist to let everybody know about all these things that he believes he has investigated and uncovered. And so the 2511 is we think the appropriate jury instruction here because while Mr. Pozner is a private figure, the Defendant, Mr. Fetzer, has repeatedly and over and over again taken the position that he is a media figure.

THE COURT: All right. Let's -- I got it now.

I see -- 2511, I think, it applies obviously, as it says,
to media defendant or private figure with a constitutional
privilege that they used actual malice.

The discussion we had about Mr. Fetzer's and Mr. Palecek's waiver and the discovery went to his concession as to Mr. Pozner. They said, well, at one point there was an argument that Mr. Pozner was a public figure, and then in that respect then, the Plaintiff, Mr. Pozner, in the discovery was asked -- sent discovery to Mr. Fetzer which he did not want to produce.

Mr. Fetzer, in exchange for not having to produce it, conceded that Mr. Pozner was a public individual and not a public figure, which then relieved the Plaintiff of the additional elements or proof that would be necessary were

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you a public individual. 2511 focuses not on the Plaintiff but on the nature of the Defendant.

Look, here's what -- I mean, we're not going to decide here today. I like to have a discussion early on. It seems to me when we get to our instruction conference, we'll then have the benefit of knowing what Mr. Fetzer actually has said in his testimony and which particular instruction more appropriately applies. I mean, it's one or the other.

MR. BOLTON: I --

THE COURT: And -- yeah?

MR. BOLTON: Well, and I agree, Your Honor.

And, so just for clarification then, which -- which has come from counsel and from Your Honor, the question of the journalist privilege then is -- is not at this point foreclosed by the summary judgment motion hearing.

THE COURT: I -- I don't think -- I'll tell you,
I don't think we talked about -- we didn't -- we didn't
talk about it in that context, to my recollection. I know
there's a transcript. My recollection was, it was very
simply, that when I asked, maybe it was Mr. Zimmerman, why
he wanted this, he said, Well, look, Judge, they're
claiming that Mr. Pozner is a public figure, and I forgot
the exact words, we need this information because it was
relevant to the elements that associated with that

1 characteristic if that's what applies. And I thought that 2 was a valid argument. And then when Mr. Fetzer understood 3 the argument, and then understanding that if Leonard Pozner was just simply a private individual and that whole 4 line of discovery was no longer necessary, he acquiesced. 5 6 MS. FEINSTEIN: And, to be clear, Your Honor, we 7 are only talking about the journalistic privilege at that hearing in the context of his objections to responding to 8 9 discovery and we -- based on your memory, which is also 10 our memory, we agreed that we didn't need to pursue 11 whether he should respond to that discovery because the 12 issue was no longer necessary or wasn't relevant anymore. THE COURT: But, Ms. Feinstein -- but the 13 14 concession, I think to the great advantage of the Plaintiff coming out of that hearing, was Mr. Pozner comes 15 into the trial as simply a private individual. 16 MS. FEINSTEIN: That's -- that's correct. 17 18 the other thing then is, of course, on summary judgment, 19 the Defendants failed to bring forth any evidence to show 20 that Lenny Pozner was a public figure. 2.1 THE COURT: Right. 22 MS. FEINSTEIN: They conceded it. 23 THE COURT: That's foreclosed. 24 MS. FEINSTEIN: Yes. Exactly. 25 THE COURT: I don't remember in that discussion

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or in the summary judgment I made any decision characterizing James Fetzer.

MS. FEINSTEIN: I think that's right. I was just saying that's what he's been telling us all along.

THE COURT: All right. So the answer to your question is, I guess, no, I did not make any rulings on whether or not James Fetzer could claim he was a media defendant.

MR. BOLTON: But -- may I speak then, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BOLTON: That issue then, being an open issue, if -- if we were to prevail on that issue, would also implicate the Court's summary judgment determination, because it would be a defense to not just the punitive damage, but it would be a defense -- the actual malice then standard would go to the fundamental nonpunitive damage but the liability question itself. And so that's -- that issue being open then, I think -- I think the issue --

THE COURT: I don't understand. I don't follow. I mean, I -- I'm not obviously going to -- I'm not cracking open the summary judgment, but -- but that was -what you just said to me -- first of all, I do two things. In my mind, I thought that puzzles me, and then out of the

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side of my eye Ms. Feinstein and Mr. Zimmerman are shaking their heads. No, the Court ruled on summary judgment that this Plaintiff had presented sufficient facts. There was no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and that the Defendants had defamed Leonard Pozner.

MR. BOLTON: But, Your Honor, the -- and that goes to the question of whether or not the statement, and there are other factors as well, but the disputed one that was discussed at length was whether, true or false, in whether that was a disputed issue of fact. But the question of privilege also goes to -- in other words, if one is acting with the -- with the privilege, that also is -- is a defense to liability.

MS. FEINSTEIN: It's a defense he would have to raise in opposition to our summary judgment and did not. So this is a really interesting discussion, maybe would be a subject of an interesting Wisconsin Lawyer article, but at this point, he didn't raise it in defense to summary judgment, and so it's foreclosed.

THE COURT: Well he didn't -- none of this was discussed or raised. And -- and the discussion I'm having now for I think largely your benefit, Mr. Bolton, because you weren't there, and also, Ms. Feinstein, and the Zimmermans, is this discussion becomes germane in terms of how you're going to try your case.

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Make no mistake, the Court already ruled on liability. So if -- if you're saying that, well, this is an interesting issue and if you're saying that it wasn't -- it -- so far we've been talking about the concession your client made in the context of that hearing as it related to the motion to compel. Now you're saying is, okay, the reason why I'm asking for actual malice is because this is a defense to the summary judgment, this is -- this is the instruction for the jury and also, by the way, a defense to summary judgment, you can't have that both ways.

Look, we're not here -- I'm not here today to tell you how to put -- try your case. We're going to go -- we're going to pick a jury and the jury is going to answer the questions on the special verdict. We'll figure out whether it's actual malice or express malice when we get to the jury instruction conference. That's all I'm talking about today, which jury instructions. I just pointed out there were two different. What -- what more in particular, I raised it because the Plaintiff has consented to the Defendants' version of the proposed special verdict. I only note that when we decide on the instruction, we should conform the question to the word used in the instruction. If we're using in Question Number 2 expressed malice, well then we ought to give the

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expressed malice instruction. If we're using the actual malice instruction, then we should change that word on Question Number 2 in your proposed special verdict and Ouestion Number 4 with Mr. Palecek.

Okay. Jury instructions, I took a look through. They're very similar. A couple of things.

I don't ordinarily, unless you want to argue strenuously, let the jurors ask questions. I've only had that one time and it -- the questions -- the only interesting part was, is how it tells the lawyers how misguided the jurors are in asking questions that you can't understand and it let's you then change, perhaps, up how you're putting your case in. It slows things down immensely and I think runs the risk of confusing. I knew that was in Plaintiff's proposed. I'm not inclined to give that one unless you wanted to be heard on that.

MS. FEINSTEIN: We're fine with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Otherwise, when we -- we get to the jury instruction conference, probably, Mr. Bolton -- well you both did -- I guess what I'd like you to do is, Ms. Feinstein, between now and the trial to get together with Mr. Bolton and produce, if you would, Ms. Feinstein, take this responsibility, three packets for me. This packet, Judge, is a ready-to-go, camera-ready group of

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instructions we agree on; pile number two is, these are the ones the Plaintiff wants but the Defendant doesn't agree to; and pile number three is just put together, these are the ones the Defendants want that the Plaintiff doesn't agree to.

Interestingly enough, I think Ms. Feinstein did something that taught me a little lesson. I always thought that when I did Jury Instruction 50, then all of a sudden we're repeating a lot of stuff, even in a short trial, it's repetitive. I kind of like the idea that because it was in 50, the preliminary instruction, for example, the Plaintiff didn't propose that we read it all over again.

MR. BOLTON: No, and in -- and I agree. I -- when I put it together, I recognized then that some of them are redundant, and I'm certainly not proposing that you repeat some of those. So those --

THE COURT: Funny thing is, is I always do because that's what always the lawyers want and --MR. BOLTON: Oh.

THE COURT: -- then I find it to be counterproductive because the jury is sort of looking at me like, How many times are you going to tell me this? And they're rather benign parts of the instructions.

> Yeah. And I recognized when I was MR. BOLTON:

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finalizing them the redundancy there, and I was too lazy to have my assistant take them out.

THE COURT: That's okay. So now you're going -that will speed us along at the jury instructions if I simply have three piles to go and the two of you get together on the ones that you agree to.

Ms. Feinstein, thank you, and actually, Mr. Bolton, thank you as well. A lot of times people just give me the blank instruction and they don't make the choices and fill in the blank. Both of you did that. Thank you for that. And when you get the agreed to, make sure it's an agreement as to the changes which is striked -- which is struck and put in.

The only one I wanted to touch on is the, quote, Introductory Statement on Litigation and the Court's Prior Determination, you proposed as an instruction. I've got some problems with this. I think the discussion really should be not necessarily in a document called Introductory Statement on the Litigation and Court's Prior Determination, but I think there is a provision in the court process for the Court to inform the jury what are some of the stipulated facts. Now those could be just stipulated facts because they're stipulated to or they could be facts found in the context of the Motion for Summary Judgment. So rather than sort of complicate

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things like this is my findings of fact, I think many of the things that they put in this document, Mr. Bolton, you'd stipulate to anyway.

The first two paragraphs, if you pull it out, are sort of in the form of an instruction. I would note, Ms. Feinstein, something you'll have to put in, any time I talk about compensation, you remember you have to put in, comma, if any. I mean, it's very important for me not to suggest that there has to be compensation because there might not be any.

So rather than for me say, "I'm going to read a short statement to try to help you understand the history and background that led to this trial. These statements have been established by the evidence and must be accepted by you, the jury, as established facts." I think the better way to do it is to say, There are certain facts of which the parties do not disagree, and then I'm to find — and then I'm going to give you those now. I mean, that then benefits both parties in that context or it doesn't disadvantage the context — each party — does not disadvantage one particular party, saying that I ruled against it, it just says they agreed to it.

For example, you'll have -- and then I think the discussion has to be fairly careful, Ms. Feinstein.

Ordinarily, I mean, I don't think Mr. Fetzer's going to

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agree that Noah Samuel Pozner was born on November 20th, 2006 in Danbury, Connecticut. Now -- right?

MR. BOLTON: Yeah.

THE COURT: Or maybe he will?

MR. BOLTON: Your Honor, and if I can talk more generally on that. I think that -- that the whole instruction is inappropriate. For instance -- for instance, if you have a case that's going to trial and there's been a summary judgment motion and decisions, I -- I have not seen that the Court then instructs the jury as to the findings of fact in that hearing that were found to be either stipulated to or -- or that the Court determined were undisputed.

Generally, if there's -- if there's an issue that has -- for instance, in this particular case, the question of whether or not the Defendant -- or the Plaintiff was -- was -- suffered any injury as a result of the four statements, I don't think actually depends upon any prior determination. So I don't know that the Court -- or the jury needs to be instructed at all about the summary judgment motion. And, certainly, the extent of what they're doing here, I've never seen done, you know, where -- where you go through a summary judgment decision, say you've got a written decision, and then instruct the jury in lieu of --

THE COURT: Oh, but Mr. Bolton, I have seen it done. It is done. Not very often because a lot of times I think the lawyers think it's a lot more complicated to then argue about particular verbiage and the like, but, look, I -- on summary judgment I concluded that the Defendants defamed Leonard Pozner by claiming that Noah Pozner's birth -- excuse me, death certificate was a fake, a fraud. Right? You know that?

MR. BOLTON: And -- and, Your Honor, in terms of the task before the jury, I don't even think they need to know that. But -- but nonetheless, I don't think you need to instruct them --

THE COURT: But -- but --

MR. BOLTON: -- any more than that.

THE COURT: But you agree, without conceding the point -- I mean, granted, I'm not asking you to agree that I made the right decision as a waiver or anything. You agree that implicit in the Court's determination that the statements that the death certificate was false and fabricated is an acceptance that, in fact, the death certificate was not false and not fabricated and therefore, correctly and legally identified a natural person named Noah Pozner who was born and died on -- as set forth on the death certificate. So having concluded the death certificate was not a false statement or a

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fabrication or a fraud, how could I not then say, implicitly, that there was a real person named Noah Samuel Pozner. And why would I then make the Plaintiff have to prove that because your clients had taken the position that he doesn't exist and never did, that he's -- that the --

MR. BOLTON: I'm not saying that they do have to prove that. I'm saying that it's not relevant --

THE COURT: If they don't have to prove it, how do I -- how do I then -- I mean, this is the whole subject -- this is a critical fact in understanding the defamation. I mean, let's not overcomplicate it. Leonard Pozner had a son named Noah, Leonard Pozner's son died, and the death certificate was prepared, and it was not a fabrication, a falsity, a fraud. That I -- I've made -- that's all done and over with. It's been determined.

MR. BOLTON: But I don't think the jury needs to be instructed on that.

THE COURT: Don't you -- but the jury needs to be -- the jury needs to know that to understand the nature of the defamation.

MR. BOLTON: Your Honor, if, in fact -- if, in fact, it is the case then that the facts underlying liability are interwoven with -- with any damage determination, then I think it's inappropriate to order a

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trial set strictly on damages.

The -- the cases, including the U.S. Supreme Court has said that, you know, in terms of ordering a trial solely on damages, that you need to be careful that if the -- if the damages question is closely interwoven with the liability question, then it's inappropriate to order a trial only -- only on the damages.

THE COURT: Okay. Well I don't think it is closely interwoven because the Court on summary judgment said there was no genuine dispute as to the fact that there existed a person named Noah Pozner and that he died. I mean, I don't -- I don't even get into the summary judgment because the Plaintiff's way of prosecuting the case didn't even need to talk about the manner in which he died, only that he died, and that he died on that date as recorded on a death certificate that was prepared by the -- by the Connecticut authorities.

So the trial on damages is now knowing that there was a man named Leonard Pozner who had a son named Noah who died but then was subjected to the defamatory statements of others by the defendants, how was he damaged?

Well, Ms. Feinstein, I don't like the language. I mean, I think tactically speaking, a number of these things here can easily be just put in quite quickly

through your client anyway. I mean, a good example is this, my guess is Leonard Pozner's going to start out by saying who he is and that he had a son and his son died.

I -- I think the way to handle this is -- and the cleanest way to do it is -- is to leave it at that.

If during the course of the defense -- I mean, make no mistake, Mr. Bolton, if -- if your witness -- if your clients testify that, in fact, Noah Samuel Pozner never existed, then I would be giving an instruction that that -- they should disregard that testimony. The Court already determined that he did exist. So I think we ought to come back and see what -- I mean, I view this as mostly -- well, in large part a curative instruction by a defense tactic intended to overcomplicate, no disrespect to Mr. Bolton, because this -- things are changing now that we have a lawyer on the other side, but when Mr. Palecek and Mr. Fetzer were unrepresented, I honestly did not -- I was not confident that their defense of the case wouldn't try to regurgitate and reargue issues already decided by the Court.

MR. BOLTON: Well, Your Honor, you don't need to make any excuse for me. If I'm trying -- if I'm overcomplicating it, I think it's because, in fact, the standards that are applicable to when -- when they -- when -- when liability is not tried with a damage case,

the -- the rules that are applicable in that situation I think are more complicated than -- and I'm willing -- I'm willing to give the Court a short memorandum on that, but --

Here's what I propose to do. I think much of what you put in here is -- is more than necessary. I think basically, Ms. Feinstein, is in the introduction I'm going to explain that -- I'm going to explain that the Court has resolved -- I don't, let's say words to -- I'm going to tell the Court [sic] that there were previous court proceedings in which the Court concluded the following -- and I think you just go right down the elements of defamation -- that Noah Pozner is the Plaintiff in this case and that he had a son. I don't remember off the top of my head, but is his birth date on the death certificate?

MS. FEINSTEIN: I believe so.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I believe it is.

THE COURT: If it is then you can put that in the finding, and that he died. You have no -- I have no problem telling the jury the salient facts as set forth in the death certificate, which I concluded there was no genuine issue of material facts over its completeness and authenticity. And you can say that I can tell them that

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the Defendants, I think in your summary judgment, a simple statement, had alleged that the death certificate was a fake or a fraud, and the Court concluded it was not, and determined that the Defendants had, in fact, defamed the Plaintiff in this case. That the function of the Court today is to hear those remaining issues, whether the Defendant is entitled to compensatory damages, if any, and whether the Defendant -- excuse me, the Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, if any, and whether the Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, if any. You will hear evidence on that and the Court will instruct you on the law.

The reason I say that, Mr. Bolton, is I don't think -- you can give me the law. I'd be happy to consider -- I welcome to read whatever you want to submit. I think it might help educate me, but I -- but I never viewed this as being very complicated. I think the Plaintiff on summary judgment had proved liability, established all the elements of defamation, and the Court concluded that the Defendants defamed Leonard Pozner, and that we were going to trial on damages. Period.

MR. BOLTON: I would have less objection if that's all we told the jury. But the notion then that we have to go through the hearing and pick and choose what in the hearing was --

THE COURT: No. 1 MR. BOLTON: -- framed --2 3 THE COURT: I agree with you. I don't -- look I'm always mindful of the power of the Court when the 4 it. Court says to the jury, especially at the outset, this is 5 6 what happened. I don't want to -- I don't view my 7 function, obviously, as to advantage or disadvantage each side other than just to set the context and frame the 8 9 question. 10 MS. FEINSTEIN: And --11 MR. BOLTON: But, Your Honor. 12 MS. FEINSTEIN: -- well, Your Honor, I was going 13 to say, we're happy to try to work with Mr. Bolton on this 14 revision. We actually sent this proposal to Mr. Bolton in advance of filing it, as we had discussed at the end of 15 16 the summary judgment hearing, to try to work with the other side to do it. We didn't hear a response from him 17 18 before our deadline, but we're happy with the Court's 19 guidance today, revise this, provide it to Mr. Bolton, and 20 see what we can come up with. 21 THE COURT: All I want to give is give a context 22 to a jury who are picking up a case that -- where 23 liability has already been determined and determined now 24 its damages.

Well --

MR. BOLTON:

THE COURT: So redraft that, send it to

Mr. Bolton, and if you can agree that, for example,

Mr. Bolton thinks that there's more in it and that you

don't really need it anyway because it's not all that

important, then we don't have a problem. I view this as

an -- I think this is an introductory instruction.

MR. BOLTON: And, Your Honor, I will work with counsel to try and come up with this. But at the same time, I don't want to -- I don't want to be put in the position then if I work with them then I have waived any objection to it as well.

a standing objection that nothing you agree to necessarily -- well, no. Let me back up on that. I mean, look. I don't think -- I think if -- if what's proposed is objectionable to you, you shouldn't agree to it.

Because I don't want to -- I don't want to give you the benefit of having agreed to something but then claim that on appeal you can raise arguments to the Plaintiff's counsel or to me that were never said. Because that's not fair to Ms. Feinstein if you say, Okay, I agree to that, but knowing that -- that you really have a great argument that it was wrong and then all of a sudden see how it turns out and then find out, Well, I have a standing objection, although I said it was okay, I never told them

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about my concerns and I want to raise them for the first 1 2 time on appeal. 3 MR. BOLTON: I understand. But to the extent -the other side of the coin is that to the extent that I'm 4 5 directed to work to come up with a statement to say that 6 then by having done that I waived my -- my more 7 fundamental objection. THE COURT: No. No. This is -- let's say this. 8 9 Ms. Feinstein has heard my comments. She'll come up with 10 a redraft. She'll share that with you. I'll then hear 11 your objections, if any, as to what she has produced. 12 MR. BOLTON: And can I anticipate one right now 13 that maybe we can -- I would object particularly to 14 including anything with regard to the standard of proof 15 for summary judgment in the statement. And the reason I 16 say that is because if we instruct the jury that there's 17 no -- there was no disputed issue of fact as to A, B, and 18 C, it pretty much then answers, you know, the --19 THE COURT: I don't intend --20 MR. BOLTON: -- actual malice question and

becomes I can't win on it.

THE COURT: I would not intend to use words summary judgment, burden of proof, standard. I think the language I would use is simple and straight forward, is in prior proceedings the Court made the following findings of Case 2018CV003122

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1 fact or something just, these are the facts the Court find 2 and based on those facts the Court concluded that the 3 Defendants had defamed the Plaintiff. The only legal words I would use is facts, findings, conclusions, 4 5 defamation. I don't want to get into summary judgment 6 methodology, no genuine dispute as to material facts 7 because the jurors' eyes will start spinning around. So I agree with you, that I don't anticipate would be in there. 8 9 MR. BOLTON: Okay. Good. 10 THE COURT: It would be as simple as that. 11 Here's the facts. This is what you need to know. So it's 12 like the inside flap of the front jacket of the book. you're going to hear the rest of the story how it's 13 14 impacted Leonard Pozner both in his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. All right. So that will take care 15 16 of then your, sort of, how to handle that. 17 18 19

Defendants' Motions in Limine. Let's start with the Defendants' Motions in Limine. I think both are in agreement that there would be no reference to the prior settlement of Wrongs Without Wremedies, right?

MS. FEINSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do we even need to tell anyone that there even was a defendant Wrongs Without Wremedies, that they were in and now they're out? Is it even going to come up? From the Plaintiff's standpoint, is there even a

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reason to mention, other than possibly maybe -- were they the publishers of the --

MS. FEINSTEIN: I think that there may -- to the extent that there's any reference to Wrongs Without Wremedies, it would come up in the context of a witness talking about what happened, but not that they were named as a party in this case and that there was a resolution or anything along those lines.

THE COURT: Do you agree with that?

MR. BOLTON: I do, Your Honor. And then just as a clarification, there is a reference to it though in the Plaintiff's proposed instructions.

MS. FEINSTEIN: We can take that out.

THE COURT: Take it out.

The other thing I learned too is we'll have to make sure the court calendar -- right now it does not refer to them. It's Leonard Pozner v. James Fetzer, et al. I learned when I did the pharmaceutical case, the long caption had all the pharmaceutical companies and the jurors every time they walked by the calendar wondered when they're going to hear about everybody else. So it's not on the calendar. It won't be on the documents. won't be on the caption. We don't give the caption to the jurors on the jury instructions.

But I'll go ahead and by stipulation of the

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parties grant the motion in limine. There won't be any reference to Wrongs Without Wremedies being sued or settlement in particular. The only mention might be is sort of factually in a transactional way as to its role in publishing certain statements.

Mr. Bolton's Number 2 is a motion excluding any evidence or reference to the partial summary judgment determination by the Court. I think I've dealt with that. I agree with you, we're not going to get into the nomenclature of summary judgment, the burden of proof. I do intend to, and Ms. Feinstein will be preparing a preliminary instruction that uses ordinary words that tells the jury what the Court did in preliminary proceedings, and that will then segue into the Court's function of -- the jury's function of determining damages.

Number 3. You wanted no reference to punitive damages until or unless the Court makes a determination that the Plaintiff has made a sufficient case for punitive damages. Questions to be submitted by the jury. Pretty standard. Any response to that, Ms. Feinstein?

MS. FEINSTEIN: I think it's -- if I understand that, I think that's standard. I think it's part of the comments of the jury instructions, and if that's what they intend to ask for, then we don't have any objection to that.

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But I guess my question is when we were just talking about the instruction that I'm going to redraft, you said, you know, the issues remaining are compensatory damages and punitive damages.

THE COURT: Well then let's clear that up, just say damages.

MS. FEINSTEIN: Just say damages?

THE COURT: Just say damages.

MS. FEINSTEIN: And then can we in voir dire ask whether any of the panel members are so opposed to punitive damages that they couldn't -
THE COURT: Good question.

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- couldn't award them?

THE COURT: Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: I think -- I think the answer is -- would be no, because, for instance, I think the reference to punitive damages in the opening statement, until the Court has made that threshold determination at the conclusion of the case, I think would be inappropriate.

THE COURT: That doesn't -- that doesn't seem right to me. That -- I mean, if you were a plaintiff's lawyer and you were asking for it, because there are people in this world that are just opposed in principle to the idea of civil punitive damages, and as a lawyer trying

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to vet people, that's certainly, if you were a plaintiff's lawyer and that person had that opinion, regardless of the evidence and the instructions of the Court, you'd really want to know that in the abstract.

MR. BOLTON: Well then -- in terms of what the Court said was relatively standard about my motion then, am I -- am I correct though that that reference to punitive damages in the opening statement would be inappropriate? Because, I mean, if, in fact, my motion is relatively standard except that it doesn't prohibit anything, then I'm not sure what would be --

THE COURT: No. Your motion goes to, I think, the valid point that the prejudicial effect of a party putting in a case repeatedly demanding punitive damage and punishing with the potential that there is insufficient evidence is inappropriate. That the prejudicial effect of talking about it in the case in advance of having to make sure that the facts are there to support it warrants not mentioning it.

Ms. Feinstein's question is entirely different. It has nothing to do with prejudicing the jury. To the contrary, it goes to what's the jury -- which jurors do you want to sit to hear the evidence. So, no, once -- the opening statements are to the panel that's been sworn. Prohibiting it to be statement -- stated until the case --

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until, as you say, makes a determination the Plaintiff has made a sufficient case for punitive damages goes to the trial.

MR. BOLTON: Okay.

THE COURT: What they're asking for is the jury selection process.

MR. BOLTON: I'll accept that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Now, I will be completely candid and honest with the -- the Plaintiff's lawyers. Although, I'm familiar with this principle, I don't know -- you'll have to tell me when it is you're going to want me to make that finding and how it affects, in fact, how you put your case in. I don't know how it works as a practical matter whether you ask that -- I mean, it seems to me then if you wait until all your evidence is in, then why even ask me, except maybe on cross-examining the defendants in their case. I don't know.

MS. FEINSTEIN: I -- I think, Your Honor, and this is a helpful discussion to have, but as I understand it, this ruling doesn't prevent us from asking questions, for example, of Defendant Fetzer that establish that he was going after Mr. Pozner and making these statements intentionally; that he thought Mr. Pozner was a liar; that he was calling Mr. Pozner a crisis actor. You know, those

kinds of things, that's fine.

I think where it comes into play would be, for example, if we wanted to admit evidence of his net worth, which there are probably other issues with that, or, you know, something along those lines, and then I think it goes to perhaps closing arguments. But I think --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- as far as asking him questions about --

THE COURT: You agree to that?

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- his intention and those kind of things, you know, without us telling, you know, saying, So now I want to talk to you about our availability of punitive damages.

THE COURT: Here's what I think. The real purpose of a good motion in limine is for everyone to walk out of the court knowing what's allowed and what's not allowed. What I've simply said is that unless the Court makes a determination that you made a sufficient case, you're not going to say the words punitive damages. I don't even think you'd say the word punitive or punish. You can say the word damage, clearly. How you prove and the questions you ask, without saying punitive damages, is up to you, right? You agree with that, Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: I do.

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THE COURT: All right. Let's go to the Plaintiff's motions. Well, have I discussed and ruled on all your motions in limine, Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are there any other motions in limine or issues you want to bring up?

MR. BOLTON: None that I have right now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So let's turn to the Plaintiff's. Plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting reference to findings of fact and liability as previously decided by the Court at summary judgment. I think we've talked about that, and I don't think that I can give -articulate a coherent order on this request that would sufficiently define what Mr. Bolton can ask or not ask or what can be -- the witnesses say or not say.

There is one issue that I want to bring up. before Mr. Bolton came on board, I think to the consternation of his clients, I made the ruling that we were not going to relitigate Sandy Hook. Plaintiffs hadn't pled the case that way. They didn't want to prosecute that way. The only question was a very, very narrow focus: Was Defendant Fetzer and Palecek's statement that the death certificate was a fraud, a falsity, and that Noah -- excuse me, Leonard Pozner

perpetrated it on, whether that was defamation.

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Mr. Fetzer, in particular, took issue with that. He wanted to and, in fact, had told the Court he thought that finally he had a venue to litigate his theory that Sandy Hook never happened. And so, on summary judgment and on discovery, we didn't go there.

Now you're asking for punitive damages, and let's say, regarding whether it's expressed or actual, in order to get punitive damages, the jury has to deliberate on, essentially, Mr. Fetzer's and Mr. Palecek's state of mind. Right, Ms. Feinstein?

MS. FEINSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does that -- doesn't that give them the ability to say, Look, I said this because I thought it was a hoax perpetrated by the Obama administration who hired crisis actors to -- I mean, that's -- that's their claim. Now, I mean, Mr. Fetzer does -- is -- I mean, I'm not telling Mr. Bolton how to put in his defense, but I mean, I'm mindful of the fact that I can't circumscribe the Defendants so tightly in the context of a punitive damage case that I did necessarily on the summary judgment. Don't you think if they want, they can start talking about their theory, the reason why it wasn't with malice is they genuinely believed Sandy Hook never happened?

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MS. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor, I think the problem here is that they -- we're not talking about Sandy Hook. We're talking about the specific statements about the death certificate here; fake, forgery, fabrication. Right? And why they made those specific statements against Mr. Pozner. We know from summary judgment that the original statements were made because, basically, as far as I can tell, they didn't take a look at what a death certificate looks like in the State of Connecticut as part -- was part of the problem. Right? But they continued to press this against Mr. Pozner, and I think, but by limiting our discussion and our case on punitive damages to the statements that are at issue here, which is that -- the defamatory statements, I think that is going -- that will help limit this whole -- I mean, because if we're going to have -- if Mr. Fetzer is going to be able to come in here, and it sounds like with his witness list, that's what he wants to do, litigate whether Sandy Hook actually happened, then I think we're going to need more than a week. THE COURT: Well, no, I've got his hours. He's

got two days. So I'm less concerned about -- I'm very concerned about the length of the defense. I'm less concerned about what he does during those periods of time.

Well, Mr. Bolton, I mean, I think -- I wonder,

because compensatory damages are all intrinsic to Leonard Pozner, how it affected him, how his -- he went to the doctor, and these things -- that's all focussing on the Plaintiff himself, compensatory damages. That would be very clean. We wouldn't have to talk about Fetzer and Palecek at all. When you talk about then malice, state of mind, do you intend to tell the jury why it is they made

THE COURT: Do you intent to put in a case -- a defense that would attempt to convince the jury that Sandy Hook was -- Sandy Hook was a hoax?

MR. BOLTON: I don't have to convince them of that for -- on the punitive damage. I have to convince them that -- that this was their understanding and that that was what was motivating them. I'm not going to ask the jury to believe one way or the other that question. But -- but it is definitely -- the question of punitive damages does not hinge upon whether or not Sandy Hook occurred or not. And so, in terms of the context of -- of their actions, I think the explanation in the broader

MS. FEINSTEIN: I mean, I think, Your Honor, that they've said in their book exactly why they're making

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these statements, and it was litigated on summary judgment. So, you know, I think -- I don't think that there is a need to relitigate whether Sandy Hook happened. That's -- that's our -- that's our concern.

THE COURT: I -- I appreciate your concern or your client's concern, although, my role is to be fair to both parties. But let me ask you this. When Leonard Pozner takes the stand, is he going to talk about the way in which his child died? I mean, I understand -- while you're debating this. I mean, lawyers on summary judgment methodology can be sort of cold and dispassionate in terms of this is an easy question, here's the document, I can prove the truth, I have genetic testing and the like. But when you're talking to 14 men and women and truly trying to get compensatory damages or punitive damages, I would have thought that you'd want to start with the story about Noah Pozner going off to elementary school in Sandy Hook, Connecticut.

MS. FEINSTEIN: Well, I think, Your Honor, the problem with that is that we aren't contending that these folks killed Noah Pozner and we can't deny that that happened and that obviously impacted, as it would impact any of us if our children were slaughtered, that it impacted Mr. Pozner. What --

> THE COURT: But --

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MS. FEINSTEIN: -- we're arguing about is how their defamatory statements --

THE COURT: No my question --

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- added on to that.

THE COURT: My question is trying to, in the week we have, to let the Plaintiff present the Plaintiff's case and let the defense present the defense.

I -- you tell me if I'm wrong. Leonard Pozner is going to talk about the death of his son and the way his son died.

MS. FEINSTEIN: I think our intention is not to -- is, you know, obviously we have to refer to -- refer to the fact that his son is dead, but our intention is not to go into -- we've said we're going to take an hour with him. That doesn't give us time to really go into all the details of that. But to really, like I said, that incident happened, but our focus is going to be on how in addition to kind of that baseline, the Defendants' conduct harmed our client. We aren't going to deny that that baseline exists and, you know, try to, like I said, tell the -- convince the jury that these folks are -- should compensate Mr. Pozner for the grief that he suffered as a result of his son dying. We're -- that's not our intention. Our intention -- and the -- Judge, I think in the instruction that I'm redrafting, it is going to say,

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you've mentioned, you know, the statements from the death certificate. So that's going to be a fact, but that isn't -- absolutely not going to be our focus at all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So then -- okay. Regardless, but what about Mr. Bolton's point? I mean, what if, just hypothetically speaking, you had a case in which a defamatory statement was made by a person who was not competent. What you're asking me essentially is to say, in the defense, having found that the defendants made a defamatory statement, lawyer comes in and says, Judge, all right, my client made that statement, and with due respect to the Court, I understand that you've ruled the statement is defamatory, but I intend to prove that my client was not competent, and therefore, an incompetent defendant can't have actual malice. In order to prove in my hypothetical that his client's not competent, he needs to tell the jury this, hypothetically -- I'm not saying this characterizes your client, Mr. Bolton -- but hypothetically speaking, this wild and crazy theory about spectacular things that are not true but yet believed by the Defendant in this hypothetical, which if the jury concluded actually happened, might enable them to say that's not actual malice. That's a, hypothetically, a disturbed individual that didn't know what he or she was

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doing. And your -- what you're saying is in this hypothetical, I shouldn't let the incompetent defendant try to defend the defamation case by proving his client was incompetent. That doesn't seem fair.

MS. FEINSTEIN: I think, Your Honor, we're actually talking about something a little bit different, because we're talking about if they want to say that they believed it, I -- you know, I think they're going to run into some issues on cross-examination. But I think the question -- the question here is whether they were acting by targeting Lenny here with actual malice, and I think that there is not -- the problem I have is that it would be improper for them to ask the jury to make a finding of fact, essentially, that's different than what you had already -- than the finding that you already made. So I have a problem with that.

But I also think that -- that we don't need to relitigate Sandy Hook for these folks.

> THE COURT: So --

MS. FEINSTEIN: If they want to say that they actually believed it to be true, then I think, you know, the problem here is that Fetzer's conceded on the record that he doesn't believe that the statement -- he doesn't believe those statements are true. Right? He's said that here on summary judgment. Right? So there's a difference

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between why did they publish the book versus the specific statements. So that's -- that's the issue I'm having. I mean, he sat here and he said, right? Well, now, yeah. I see -- I don't believe it anymore. And in fact --

THE COURT: Well some --

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- at summary judgment --

THE COURT: Some --

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- he put together --

THE COURT: Some parts.

MS. FEINSTEIN: -- a different defense about what was false or what made it fake, fabricated, or forged than he put together in the book.

THE COURT: I understand. He conceded some but not all. He -- I believe he acquiesced that he was now satisfied that his earlier claims -- I can't remember which one -- that he was satisfied now he was wrong. Look, the whole purpose of my having this discussion is to enable the lawyers to do their jobs in the week that we have.

I'm going to deny your motion in limine as you've drafted it, Number 1, for two reasons. One is, I don't think I could clearly define for Mr. Bolton the contours of what he can't do through his questions and what he cannot elicit from his clients.

I do agree with you that the Plaintiff has

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utilized the summary judgment methodology and already proven that -- the legal conclusion that there was defamation, and consistent with that, the facts I found to support that conclusion, that there was a death certificate, that it was not false, that it contained this information. And that I have no problem instructing the jury that Leonard Pozner had a child and the child's name was Noah Pozner, the child died, and any other information on the death certificate. And that the Defendants' statements that he fabricated it, part or all of the information, is -- was defamation.

I tend to agree with Mr. Bolton that to defend his client against punitive damages, he has to tell the story -- he has to tell the story from their perspective why they did this. And we know what Mike Palecek and James Fetzer said and says, so be prepared for the fact that he said, They said it because they believed there was no Sandy Hook massacre. Nobody died at Sandy Hook. I mean, I have no doubt in the course of the two days somebody's going to mention the title of the book, Nobody Died at Sandy Hook.

MR. BOLTON: In fact, Your Honor, I don't know that there's been any motion to even exclude the book, and I -- I can't imagine that -- that a chapter in a book which is alleged to be defamatory is going to be coming in

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without the entire book.

THE COURT: Maybe so. But you ought to be prepared for that. And what I attempt to accomplish in my final pre-trial conference is just to let you know that, I mean, you can make whatever objections -- evidentiary objections are pertinent at the time and I'll rule on them.

Please don't anyone make an objection in front of the jury that says, Judge, they're violating the Court's order or that you already ruled on that. If you think that either of the parties have done something then you can ask for a sidebar. That's inherently prejudicial and I do not allow it.

I think when you flip the focus to the Defendants and ask the jury to look into their minds, Mr. Bolton, you open the door to allow them, Mr. Bolton, to tell the story, arguably fantastic story, that was set forth in the book they published. And quite honestly, for the jury to truly understand succinctly what this is about, I would think that the Plaintiff would want that to some extent anyway, because it, I would think, it defines who he is and how it's affected him in the context of the specific allegation that this -- he fabricated and falsified a death certificate for an alleged child he never had.

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So for trial, I just want to let you know, Ms. Feinstein, I think there's more going to be coming in than what came in on summary judgment, because the summary judgment was a very -- I want to make a record on that because it had come up. The summary judgment was a very carefully pled, presented, and argued question by the Plaintiff limiting the issue, and it was decided. Summary judgment did not decide actual or express malice or the nature of Mr. Pozner or Mr. Palecek. To the contrary, I didn't let them tell me why it is they made those alleged statement -- why they made those statements, because it wasn't relevant to that issue that the Plaintiffs -- that the Plaintiff presented. Now I think you have the opportunity to tell that story.

But just bear in mind, I do keep track of time. I've got your notes about the two hours, two hours. If I add that up, you're going to probably start on Tuesday morning, you're going to be done Thursday by noon.

MR. BOLTON: Well let me ask you this. Am I -have I created then a limit?

THE COURT: Have you created a limit?

MR. BOLTON: In other words, are you saying that -- that -- that my estimate -- my time estimates are a binding commitment and that by noon on Thursday, I'm done or --

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THE COURT: I don't have a clock. I don't have a bell I ring or a gong that I bang. What it means is as follows. I don't have my -- let me make a record on this, so that anyone knows what I'm doing and why. When we had our scheduling conference, I handle them always the same We don't ordinarily do them on the record, I don't remember if I did, but there comes a time in which we pick a trial date and then I ask people how long is it going to need to try the case. And if anyone says it's a two week, it's a three week, it's a four week, I'll ask some questions, but I always give the time people tell me they need to put their case in. And in this case, I can tell you, nobody asked for more than a week. The plan was one week. All right. So that's number one. Number two. In terms of the Defendant, well,

Number two. In terms of the Defendant, well, remember, the Plaintiff has the burden of proof. So if you took the time and you cut it in half, you ought to give the Plaintiff a little more than half because they have the burden of proof. Now I see that the -- the Plaintiff can -- believes it's sort of like, Name That Tune, it can prove its case in three bars, three witnesses, about three hours of direct, that's about six hours of testimony. That's like less than one day.

So if you said, Judge, if I use those conventions of the defense should not really be any longer

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than the plaintiff's case, you should have a day. want to double it. Fine. You can have two days. you say I need to sort of put in testimony, three to one, I need three days, then either you're going into issues not raised by the plaintiff or it's not relevant, and then there will be increasingly sustained objections of relevance, and then it creates a situation where the jury perceives that the Court's speeding a long the defense. You know how that works.

I -- Mr. Bolton and I are the same -- actually, might be the same age. I've known Mr. Bolton since law school days. He's an experienced trial lawyer. So have you limited? Yeah. I don't -- I don't have Monday. We don't have court on the weekends and Monday's something else. So it's Friday. You have Monday to Friday. you're only halfway done Friday morning, you've got a big problem. And it's -- can only be, I think in my mind, is that it's because you've lost control of your defense and you're putting in much, much more than really is necessary given the Plaintiff's case. And you'll likely hear from me, outside the presence of the jury, my consternation.

The other thing, I can make a finding, because I hear from the jury is one week is a huge amount of time. Remember, humans today are -- used to be in my generation it was 30 minutes, because that's how long a TV show

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lasted. Now attention spans are not five days. doesn't benefit any of the parties. This is not a five-day trial.

So you do what you need to do, but I can't see how the defense should take more than twice the time the Plaintiff does given they don't have the burden of proof.

MR. BOLTON: Well, I understand and I hear, Your Honor, and I will try to be -- and I agree, I think the more efficient is better.

But I will also say that, you know, the Court's rule of thumb explanations that the defense should always be or should generally be less than the Plaintiff and what not because they have the burden of proof, I think in this particular case, and probably in many cases and certainly many defamation cases, the question of punitive damages, I think, skews those sort of standard expectations. But I'm not saying that -- I'm not intending for this case to go beyond the one week.

THE COURT: Okay. So if the Plaintiff -- look, this is -- if things go ordinarily and I think we'll be a little slower on jury selection, but ordinarily, the Plaintiff calls its first witness about 1:00 o'clock on Monday. Because after you pick a jury, they've got to go move their cars, go out for lunch. That's ordinarily. We've got six hours. We take a 15 minute break in the

1 morning, 15 minute break in the afternoon. In the 2 afternoon, if you come back at 1:00 that's -- we go to 3 4:30, so that's three and a half hours on the first day. I envision, Ms. Feinstein, you know, even with a slower 4 jury selection, you'll be finished by lunch time Tuesday. 5 This is the final pre-trial conference. 6 7 my attempt which I tell people at the scheduling conference you should come to the final pre-trial 8 9 conference -- I know you weren't there, maybe you've been 10 at my final pre-trial conference -- but you should come 11 here knowing -- ready to try your case. So if you call 12 your first witness on -- after lunch Tuesday, when I add up your time, you've got nine and a half hours of direct. 13 14 That's -- that's, let's say, 20 hours of testimony. Okay. That might be two and a half days. So do you envision 15 16 under any circumstances that you won't complete your 17 defense by the end of Thursday? 18 MR. BOLTON: No, I don't contemplate that. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. BOLTON: I do contemplate not finishing by 2.1 Thursday. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. BOLTON: I didn't mean to be provocative by 24 my -- I was really just -- because I know there are some 25 courts where they do have a timer. And so when I -- my

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real question was simply, am I -- you know, is there -- is there an egg timer that I need to keep track of. But I didn't mean to imply that I was intending to --

> THE COURT: No.

MR. BOLTON: -- stretch this out into an endurance.

THE COURT: I think it benefits the process and I think I do my job better if you get a sense of what might expectations are, right or wrong. And my expectations are I want this to go to the jury on Friday. Sometime, I mean, if it's Friday at lunch, I'm okay with that. But I don't want to send it to the jury at -- I want to finish that week and I don't want to send it to the jury at 6:00 o'clock.

I think, with due respect, Mr. Bolton, my worry, given my experience now, is as follows. Mr. Palecek seems to be a man of very few words, maybe because he's sitting next to Mr. Fetzer. That's just in the cases that I've had here. I don't think that -- I'm not anticipating a problem in which you'll have witness -- lack of control over Mr. Palecek on the stand who won't stop talking.

Mr. Fetzer -- Professor Fetzer, Dr. Fetzer has, in my experience in court, exhibited a proclivity toward perhaps it's professorial discourse. Now, maybe every question is a 15 minute answer. I don't know. I think

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what I'm saying to you is you ought to meet with your client and say, look, we're going have to cut this back. You don't have all the time in the world to tell your story. You're going to tell your story, I'm going to get it in, but we've got to be succinct and efficient, and you've got to stay on point and answer the questions. Because I envision the problem is, is you're not going to limit Mr. Fetzer to a couple hours if you let him start talking.

All right. So for those reasons, I'm going to deny the Motion in Limine No. 1, but, Ms. Feinstein, you certainly have leave to raise any kind of evidentiary objection at the time these questions are asked.

Number 2. Prohibit reference to the impact of other negative or defamatory statement on the Plaintiff's reputation. What's your response to that one?

MR. BOLTON: I'm not exactly -- I don't completely understand the nature of the motion. I think the motion is saying that to the extent that I want to present evidence or argument relating to the questions of causation and whether or not damages are speculative, that I cannot do that. And so to the extent that that's the intent of the motion, then I obviously oppose it.

MS. FEINSTEIN: Your --

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THE COURT: Well, why don't you tell me what you

had hoped that you would come out of today knowing -- everyone knowing what is out of bounds?

MS. FEINSTEIN: Sure, Your Honor. So let's -let's use a hypothetical. Let's say that three different
people have made statements about me that may be
defamatory and in one instance, one of those people,
Person A, has -- I've sued and the Court has determined on
summary judgment that those statements are defamatory and
so we are going to a damages case about the statements
that Person A made about me and how that has damaged me.

What we would ask -- what we ask the Court to decide is that the defendant cannot come into court and say, Oh, yeah, sure, you have -- you're claiming that you were hurt but really you were hurt by Persons B and C, and not -- you know, and Persons B and C were really the ones that were damaging your reputation and not so much me, or to the extent that there is damage, we only did part of it because it was B and C and we were A and so lots of harm was done. And that's -- that's the incremental harm issue that we're -- we're here to talk about the harm that was done to Mr. Pozner by these Defendants and we believe the law in Wisconsin doesn't recognize the doctrine of incremental harm.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's --

MS. FEINSTEIN: I'm sorry. I said that wrong.

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Let's say that I already have -- that they're going to come in and say that I have a bad reputation to begin with. It's -- I think -- I'm talking about the eggshell plaintiff, right? It doesn't -- you know, they have to take me as I come to them when they made their defamatory statements.

THE COURT: Let me rephrase it this way, see if we can take it in pieces. Mr. Bolton, let's say they want a motion in limine, nobody should talk about defamatory statements made by somebody else. Do you think it's relevant that, let's say, Mr. Fetzer says, Oh, Joe Blow repeatedly says Leonard Pozner is a liar and a cheat. What's the possible relevance of someone else's defamatory statements?

MR. BOLTON: Well, the suggestion there is then that there is no -- no limitation in terms of causation. If, in fact, for instance, let's say that -- that there was evidence that other people made statements about someone and it had no effect on them, they claimed that it was -- that they were completely, you know, immune to it, but then -- but then in terms of the narrow issue that they've tried to confine this case to, that it was -- that it was, you know, just the most traumatic event in the world. To say that I can't argue facts and present evidence that would go to the question of causation, I --

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THE COURT: No, that's not what I'm saying. Let me see if I can say it this way. I -- there are two aspects. Certainly, you can cross-examine on causation. My question is very simple. I don't think it's fair for, let's say, James Fetzer to say in defense that my defamatory statement didn't really harm Leonard Pozner because 25 other people said the same thing or worse. The reason I think that's inappropriate is, is, well, maybe Mr. Pozner thinks those are all defamatory, those are all hurtful and spiteful: What does he do now? Now he's pushed back on the heels to say, Well, do I -- why didn't I sue them? They're not here. They could be slightly different in the context of what they said. So the actual statements made by anyone else I don't think -- I think are highly prejudicial and not probative.

Now, I do think, Ms. Feinstein, that Mr. Bolton perhaps on cross-examination of Mr. Pozner can say just generically speaking, that, you know, maybe he had described on how hard this has been and the nature of these kinds of things that people have been saying or something like that. I think Mr. Bolton can make sort of a general reference to say, like, Yeah, but why is this one statement so damaging to you in the context of the way that you've been living your life.

MS. FEINSTEIN: I think that's fine, Your Honor.

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Our concern would be -- and I apologize because I messed up my argument to begin with -- but our concern would be if the defense is going to come after Mr. Pozner and say, well, you didn't have much of a reputation to begin with before we made these statements, that's the doctrine of incremental harm.

MR. BOLTON: I don't intend to do that.

THE COURT: One thing -- I don't know if you know Mr. Bolton. I would say this -- I'd say this about anyone. If he says he's not going to do it, he's not going to do it. You can take him at his word for that. don't think that would we right anyway to sort of trash the guy and say he's got a bad reputation, you can't damage a guy that's already bad.

Mr. Bolton, I think you can ask those questions without getting into the specific statements made by specific individuals. I don't think it's fair to Leonard Pozner, for example, for James Fetzer to say, Well, I might have said that but Kelley Watt said a lot worse. Why isn't she here? Do you think that -- are you intending to do something like that by way of comparison?

MR. BOLTON: I think -- I think -- I don't anticipate asking that specific question. But what I will say more generically is that the notion of -- in terms of trying to establish for Plaintiff damages, and

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particularly for emotional distress or that type of -- the question of causation comes up all the time, and it's disputed and it's -- it's questioned. And so to say that -- that there's something unique about damages here that we're going basically not -- that the -- that the issues and challenges to causation are not relevant or whether or not damages are speculative or not, I don't know that those general rules that would be applicable to other cases are thrown out the window. The fact that a damage case may be difficult is not -- is not a basis then for simply simplifying it for the sake of efficiency.

THE COURT: Okay. This is what we're going to Ms. Feinstein, this is another example where I agree do. with you in principle. I think what is best for me to do is rule on the objection when I hear the question. will guide you. I presently don't think what some other person -- what some other third party said, specifically if you name the name, my ears will perk up. If you say that this other person said this. Sort of like other prior bad acts of other individuals, it -- you know, it -its probative value is completely outweighed by the prejudicial effect, like I shouldn't be held accountable because a lot of people say bad stuff about him.

Now, having said that, context is everything. think context is a component of causation. And I think

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that if he's asked this question about, well, I don't know, strategically if he intends to do it, but if he wants to try to put in a case like, Hey, toughen up, Leonard Pozner. So what's the big deal? I mean, a lot of people -- I mean, a lot of bad things have been said about you, like why should you get anything for this one? I mean, I think he can talk in a general sense of context being probative of causation. And that -- that doesn't bother me. But I have to really listen to the question.

I don't think that Leonard Pozner should then have to defend himself as to why he didn't sue other people for specific statements. But he has to -- he will have to explain in his causation a little bit about himself on why it is he's asking for what you're going to ask for from these two people for those statements that they make. And the jury's going to know or suspect, well, I need to know a little bit about context anyway because it's possible they're going to hear about the things he's been doing to defend himself and his sons and they might wonder about that. So if Mr. Bolton wants to ask a question, he should be prepared for your client to have an answer to why is it that he's here asking for that amount of money from these two people without regard to having other things swirling about.

So one thing I do tell you guys, which I think

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you know anyway, I do have realtime so I can -- I can watch as I listen, and I do have the ability to actually look at the exact question when it's framed in ruling on an objection.

Once again, by denying your motions in limine, I'm not saying I don't agree with your principles, I'm just saying that these are issues that I can't articulate in such a way that would be so clear as to give Mr. Bolton the benefit of knowing what's in and what's out. I think the comments I make should guide the parties on how I'm likely to rule when the question is made and an objection is tendered.

Ms. Feinstein, have I ruled on all your motions in limine?

MS. FEINSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, I have to be corrected. Thank you from my clerk. Three preemptory challenges. Judicial Benchbook CV 12-13. This is what it says: party is entitled to three preemptory challenges exercised alternatively, beginning with the plaintiff.

Mr. Bolton, here's the Benchbook says, When two or more defendants have adverse interests, Court in its discretion may allow each defendant three strikes.

So we'll go with the 12, plus 2 is 15, plus 6 is 21. Call up 21 people.

1 If you think that you can establish 2 Mr. Palecek's interest are adverse to Mr. Fetzer, then 3 I'll hear from you as to whether Mr. Fetzer should have his own set of three strikes. 4 5 MR. BOLTON: So right now the number is -- what 6 number? 7 THE COURT: Three. MR. BOLTON: Yeah. 8 THE COURT: Three. 10 MR. BOLTON: Okay. 11 THE COURT: Anything else? Anything else that 12 you guys want to talk about? 13 MR. ZIMMERMAN: We do have one thing, Your 14 Honor, if I might. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. ZIMMERMAN: It recently came to our 17 attention that Defendant Fetzer forwarded the videotape 18 deposition of my client to a number of individuals. 19 deposition was marked confidential under the order that 20 Your Honor issued. The individuals who received that, it 2.1 is our understanding, have forwarded screenshots, and we 22 are not sure what other information, to any number of 23 unrelated third-party individuals. Discovery in this case is closed. We can't meaningfully do anything to determine 2.4 25 how far this confidential information has spread.

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THE COURT: I'm sorry, I don't have a perfect recollection of the circumstances in which I concluded that the deposition is confidential.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The -- Your Honor entered a confidentiality order by which the parties had the ability to designate a document or other discovery as confidential. It would be treated as confidential and not disclosed to any third parties until and unless there was a challenge and the Court determined that the document or discovery was not confidential.

Here, for example, Your Honor, the videotape deposition includes testimony about my client's psychiatric or psychological treatments, which I don't think would be difficult under Wisconsin law to establish are entitled to confidentiality. Moreover, the transcript itself is marked confidential on every page, and there was a pretty extensive discussion at the end of that deposition about how important it was that the deposition doesn't find its way splashed out onto the internet.

THE COURT: I do have a recollection, but maybe I'm conflating cases. Did there come a time, Mr. Zimmerman, in which I admonished the defendants about the importance of staying on task and not trying this case in the -- a public forum?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: In the context of that

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confidentiality order, which was a stipulated order entered into by all the defendants -- I believe Mr. Palecek wasn't on the call, but he assented to it later -- Your Honor actually instructed all of the parties that violations of the Court's order would be dealt with and had the potential for extremely serious consequences, I believe you stated, up to and including incarceration in Dane County Jail. So there was a fairly extensive explanation by the Court as to the importance of complying 10 with the Court's confidentiality order. THE COURT: Did you talk to Mr. Bolton about this yet?

> MR. ZIMMERMAN: We've started talking, and -again, we can't do discovery on it. So I'm not sure what the process should be for us, which is why I raise it. think we're looking for guidance.

I would just say though, Your Honor, your concern that you raised at the very beginning about an anonymous jury I don't think is an irrational concern. You've received e-mails, I've received e-mails, my client continues to receive extensive communications. He has had death threats before. And going into that deposition, there was an understanding that the video would be kept confidential. There are now pictures of my client, new up-to-date pictures of my client circulating among the

MR. BOLTON: It was a woman.

THE COURT: -- lawyer?

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1	MR. BOLTON: Yeah.
2	THE COURT: Purported lawyer
3	MR. BOLTON: Yeah.
4	THE COURT: who's not licensed to practice
5	law?
6	MR. BOLTON: Yes. Yeah. Yeah.
7	THE COURT: So let's set that one aside.
8	Wolfgang Halbig. Why did he send this to this person?
9	He's not a witness. He's not an expert. He's not have
10	any involvement in this case. In fact, it sounds even
11	worse that your client would share it with a person who
12	Mr. Pozner previously sued elsewhere.
13	MR. BOLTON: I don't know the answer to that,
14	Your Honor. But what I will tell you is that I have
15	and I neither knew that it was going to happen nor
16	and I probably should have did I know that it was
17	marked confidential. I've instructed him not to happen
18	for that not to happen. I have also communicated with
19	Mr. Halbig that that he is not to circulate it in
20	any
21	THE COURT: Well you've got no leverage on that.
22	MR. BOLTON: Pardon me?
23	THE COURT: You have no leverage on Mr. Halbig.
24	MR. BOLTON: Your Honor
25	THE COURT: Is it H-A-L-B

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MR. ZIMMERMAN: I-G, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I-G.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: And by way of context, my client's former -- my client's lawsuit against Mr. Halbig was for disclosing personal information, including all of his previous addresses and his social security number publicly.

The attorney was suspended from Colorado after she accused the Colorado Supreme Court of being involved in a grand conspiracy, and the conditions of her reinstatement were a psychiatric evaluation, which she determined she would not undertake.

Your Honor, respectfully, these are about the two worst people that could have received this kind of confidential information. And, you're right, Halbig is a Florida resident. As far as we know, Alison Maynard is a Texas resident. The Court has no ability to constrain their behavior nor has their -- have their prior acts indicated that they would be people who would be amenable to constraint.

THE COURT: What are you asking me to do? MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, we'd like the Court to undertake an investigation. Figure out who Mr. Halbig sent it to. How broadly did this go, to the extent Dr. Fetzer has access to that information or can otherwise

provide access to that information. 1

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THE COURT: Well, I don't do investigations. That's sort of like -- that's Italy, you know, you have Italian magistrate, but we can notice up and Mr. Fetzer can be required to come to court to testify, and you can examine him and the Court can examine him too. you're asking -- it's a motion for contempt.

> (Nods head in the affirmative.) MR. ZIMMERMAN:

THE COURT: And I probably -- I do have a recollection, because Mr. Fetzer and Mr. Palecek were unrepresented, I went through the language one necessarily has to put in a motion to apprize them of the sanctions, which could include incarceration, most people -- to most that is the worst, or it could be other things regarding the litigation, like, if -- if he was the plaintiff, dismissal, or now making findings of other some facts. Those I would need though to hear from you as to what you want and then I would take those into consideration.

Look, I think, Mr. Bolton, I think it's pretty clear, apparently, these are the facts. I would have to look back, but apparently -- well, not apparently, I signed a confidentiality order. Mr. Zimmerman is saying, as an officer of the court, that everyone agreed to a confidentiality order. The deposition -- at the time of the deposition, did you take the deposition or you were

there? 1 MR. ZIMMERMAN: This was my client's deposition, 2 3 but I was there defending him, yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you are saying there was some 4 discussion on the deposition transcript reiterating the 5 confidential nature of the deposition? 6 7 MR. ZIMMERMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: And the deposition itself is stated 8 confidential by the court reporter. 10 MR. ZIMMERMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: I note that your client is -- he 12 repeatedly tells me he's an educated man. He's a former, I want to say McKnight, that might not be, professor at 13 14 the University of Minnesota Duluth. He's got a PhD. He certainly can read, right, Mr. Bolton? 15 16 MR. BOLTON: I -- Your Honor, I'm going to interpret that as a rhetorical question. But -- but --17 18 THE COURT: It was a rhetorical. 19 MR. BOLTON: -- treating -- but treating it as 20 such, I will concede that my client can read. 2.1 THE COURT: You concede what? 22 MR. BOLTON: That he can read. That was the 23 question as I understood it. 24 THE COURT: Are you going to concede that he

violated the Court's order?

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MR. BOLTON: I believe that's the -- I believe 1 2 that to be true, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Well then there needs to be consequences. You would like to pursue this matter? 4 5 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes, I -- I think we have to, 6 Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. Well then we are now -are you sticking around town? Do you want to come back 8 tomorrow afternoon? 10 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Unfortunately, Your Honor, I'm 11 not and unable to come back tomorrow afternoon. 12 THE COURT: Okay. We'll go off the record and see if we can find some schedule. 13 14 (Off-the-record discussion.) THE COURT: We'll go back on the record. I do 15 16 need -- we need to follow format. You need to file a 17 motion for contempt. I believe there needs to -- you can 18

easily find -- Ms. Feinstein can find it -- there's some language that needs to be put in there. Ordinarily it has to be personally served on the contemptuous party. Mr. Bolton will accept service. And because we're going to pick a date that's mutually convenient, then presumably, the date in the notice of motion and motion will be acceptable to the parties.

THE CLERK: What's this meeting you have Friday?

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THE COURT: Go off the record.

(Off-the-record discussion.)

THE COURT: Once again -- we'll go back on the record. My clerk, she is the best clerk in Dane County, by the way.

> MS. FEINSTEIN: Now that we're on the record. THE COURT: Yeah. May 3rd, 2019:

"If a party is determined to have breached the confidentiality agreement, those -- that party may be held after notice and a hearing in contempt of court. Let me make very clear, any party who is shown to intentionally violate the terms and conditions of a confidentiality order in this case should subject themselves and be prepared for the possibility of such remedies as incarceration in the Dane County Jail. More importantly, in civil actions, it may result in a dismissal of the claims, a dismissal of counterclaims. It may result in the Court making findings of fact that will be read to the jury if this case goes to the jury. Essentially, the consequences of an intentional proven violation of the confidentiality order will be serious, swift, and severe.

"Make no mistake about it, everything I've read about this case, there's this constant sort of tug and pull, maybe even on behalf of all the parties, given that Mr. Pozner, himself, has given interviews and appears in

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the paper. So I'm not simply saying this about Wrongs
Without Wremedies, Mr. Fetzer, or -- or you, Mr. Palecek.
I'm saying this about everyone.

"There may be a temptation to use the information that's discovered in this case to perpetuate the online or media debate that's going on and will continue to go on, but if I find out that any party -- any party has breached this confidentiality agreement and the party that accuses the other has proven to the Court, the consequence will be significant.

"I'm not going to let this litigation become ensnared or enmeshed in this overall, overriding controversy in dispute. That's between you gentlemen and the entities elsewhere beyond the scope of this agreement -- beyond the scope of this litigation. My job, and the authority of the Court is to protect the confidentiality of these documents in the context of this litigation and to see whether the Plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence the claim it's brought."

And that was May 3rd, 2019.

THE CLERK: That was the transcript date.

THE COURT: What's that?

THE CLERK: That was the transcript date. The hearing was actually April 26th.

THE COURT: April 26th. Unfortunately, I guess

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it came to fruition.

I mean, I'm curious if Mr. Zimmerman doesn't ask the question or Ms. Feinstein doesn't ask the question, we'd like to know why he did this.

Okay. Is that time convenient for you, Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: Yep. Works for me.

THE COURT: All right. You can put that on the notice of motion and motion. Anything else?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything, Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much for coming.

Now we won't have an opportunity to get together until the day of trial. I always sometimes say to people if you settle the case then let me know. I think that's probably -- well, my mother always said hope springs eternal, but the chances of this settling are probably slim to none. Just bear in mind that if someone changes their mind about the trial, because of the number of jurors we'll be summoning in, the last time for me to avoid inconveniencing Dane County residents will be about Thursday at lunch. So please, if you think that this case is not going to trial, I'd like to know so we don't

1 inconvenience these people who have jobs and lives and 2 there are costs associated with -- with that. 3 Unless I get something from you, Mr. Bolton, on the strikes, I think that was the only loose end, right? 4 We'll just pick -- we'll 8:30 --5 6 MR. BOLTON: You gave me at least the -- if, in 7 fact, on the anonymous --THE COURT: Oh. 8 MR. BOLTON: -- anonymity issue. As I -- as I 10 say, I don't -- I don't anticipate having any further 11 thoughts on that, but if I do, I will let the Court know 12 immediately. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MS. FEINSTEIN: And then, Your Honor, you asked me to resubmit the introductory instruction based on the 15 16 discussion today --17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 MS. FEINSTEIN: -- and the questions. 19 would you like that? 20 THE COURT: Well, that's the -- you can have --2.1 maybe have that done sometime the Friday before the trial, 22 so at least Mr. Bolton can have it over the weekend and 23 not multitask. I -- hopefully that will be agreed to by the parties as to be -- just other than a bareboned 24 25 recitation of the facts relating to the death certificate.